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Since the Afghan crisis and the Soviet intervention of December 1979, more
than three million Afghans have sought refuge in Pakistan. During fieldwork
(1986-87), we tried to find out how the exile situation has affected their
identity.
The Afghan refugees seem to define themselves along three ideological
models. The most familiar to us is the one of 'refugee' as defined and governed
by the Convention of the United Nations of 1951. The second is related to the
norms of the tribal code of honour as practised by the Afghans, where tribal
groups seek temporary shelter among kin. The third model, that of mohajer,
and perhaps the most important, refers to Muhammad's flight from Mecca to
Medina in 622 AD and has a religious significance. The second and the third
models are more significant than the first.
To the outsider, each of the three types of identity may seem to contradict
the others. To the Afghan refugees, however, these diverse constituents of a
new and complex identity are not contradictory; instead, they coexist in the
consciousness the refugees have of their situation and are used in different
ways, according to the context.
Quand des habitudes se"culaires s'effondrent, quand des genres de
vie disparaissent, quand de vieilles solidarity s'effritent, il est,
certes, friquent qu'une crise d'identite" se produise (Claude Levi-
Strauss, L'idehtiti, p. 9).
Since the Marxist Coup on 27 April 1978 and the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, more than three million Afghans have
sought asylum in Pakistan. This exodus has several causes, but is due in par-
ticular to military operations and repression in Afghanistan, as well as to the
refusal of the Afghan people to submit to a government they consider atheist.
The above quotation of Levi-Strauss applies perfectly to the situation of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. For these Afghans, what was once the basis of
social life, power, and daily existence has been threatened if not completely
disrupted or even destroyed. As the Pakistani anthropologist Akbar Ahmed,
member of the Civil Service, put it: 'The kaleidoscope of traditional patterns
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has been shaken - leadership, women, and even children are affected. New
voices are being heard, new values emerging. Afghan society will never be the
same again' (1986:166).
It is important to realize that the livelihood of 85 per cent of the Afghan
population depended on agriculture at the time of the Coup of 1978
(Centlivres 1985), while now, in Pakistan, the Afghan refugees (AR) have no
access to the land. Consequently, the relations of production - in other words
the very foundations of social hierarchy, power and influence, alliance and
inheritance which are bound to the possession of the land - are being challenged
in the new situation. Out of this upheaval affecting the lives of millions of
people, what are the cultural resources the refugees can count on to help them
reorganize their existence, their social relationships, and their mental universe?
On which beliefs can they base their ideas of what is happening to them? From
•what can they reconstruct an identity?
The image of Self and Other, or social identity in Afghanistan, rested not on
an idea of nation and citizenship, but on a feeling of appurtenance both to a
supranational entity, the Islamic community or umma, and to an infranational
one, the regional, tribal, or ethnic community (Centlivres 1980; Centlivres and
Centlivres-Demont 1981-82). However, though the AR continue more than
ever to claim that they belong to the Islamic faith, the Islamic community itself
appears divided, since the government in Kabul also claims to be orthodox
Islamic. As for the -bases for an infranational identity, they are completely
shaken by exile itself, since the AR, transplanted from their environment, no
longer live in their former communities composed of kinship or neighbouring
groups.
In these conditions, the identity of Afghans exiled in Pakistan cannot help
but mirror the crisis and its complexity, contradictions, and transformations.
Yet within this disrupted society an observer can discern certain conscious
models which organize perception and practices. Images or general schemes
which have been borrowed and enculturated contribute to ideological con-
struction and to the quest for identity.
In the following text, we examine the new dimensions of the identity of the
Afghan refugees by exploring the notion of 'refugee' as it is lived and imagined
by the AR themselves and by all those who have to deal with them.
Fieldwork among Afghan Refugees
We worked as a couple in Afghanistan several times between 1964 and 1978, a
total stay of more than four years. Our research centred first on the markets -
in particular that of Tashqurghan, between Mazar-i Sharif and Kunduz
(Centlivres 1972), then on questions of ethnic identity and interethnic relations
in North Afghanistan. After the Coup of 1978 and Soviet intervention in 1979,
fieldwork was no longer possible within Afghanistan. In 1986 we applied for a
grant from the Swiss Directorate of Development Cooperation and
Humanitarian Aid (DCA) to study the material and symbolic forms of adjust-
ment of the AR in Pakistan.
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We worked particularly in Chitral, in the Peshawar district, where there is
the greatest concentration of refugees in Pakistan; in Waziristan; in
Baluchistan; and in Mianwali in the province of Punjab. Here the Pakistani
administration has set up new camps to avoid overpopulating the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and to keep AR away from the Afghan border.
Our stay in the camps was facilitated by the Pakistani authorities and the
UNHCR. Our knowledge of dari (Afghan Persian) permitted us to converse
directly with the AR, including the Pushtuns, who almost all know the second
language of Afghanistan.
Refugees from different origins, in particular former notables - 'white
beards' - and representatives of the political parties of the Afghan Resistance,
as well as employees of the Pakistani camp administration and experts from
International Organizations were interviewed. We also had the opportunity to
speak with teachers from both the official and the religious schools for Afghan
children, and with Pakistanis who live near the refugee camps. To complete
the data we consulted documents pertaining to the Pakistani administration of
the camps and a corpus of brochures, magazines, and bulletins edited by dif-
ferent movements of the Afghan Resistance.
During our fieldwork in Pakistan in the Autumn and Winter of 1986-87, we
tried to find out, among other things, whether the notion of 'refugee', for
those concerned, was identical to that of the Convention of the United Nations
of 1951 and the ensuing Protocols, and - in the likely case that there existed a
gap between the Afghan concept and that of the UNHCR - to discover the
ideological model which the AR referred to in order to define themselves.
Broadly speaking, our work helps to point out the ambiguity of the concept
'refugee', and the difficulty that one encounters when the definitions drawn up
by international law are confronted with culturally different conceptions
within a concrete situation.
Three Facets of Identity
For the International Organizations (IO) and the Government of Pakistan
(GOP), the refugees are defined and governed by the Convention of the United
Nations of 1951 which was expanded by the ensuing Protocol of 1967 and, for
Africa, by the Convention of the Organization of African Unity of 1969.
According to the Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967, the refugee is a
person who, 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . .'
(Article 1A).
According to the abundant literature dedicated to refugees, one notices first
of all that priority is given to the individual: the 'refugee'. The latter is described
as being a victim of circumstances over which he has no control, condemned to
poverty and dependence, and having a right to humanitarian relief; he must be
given refuge, protected, nourished, and cared for - in other words taken
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charge of (see Hyndman 1987 and Refugees: Dynamics of Displacement 1986,
among others). As D'Souza points out, the stereotype of the refugee includes
the following characteristics: 'poor, ill-educated, and undernourished. The
common view (often derived from media pictures or charities' advertisements)
is one of pathetic individuals, their children and a few belongings on their
backs, fleeing with fear and bewilderment in their eyes' (1981:7). These images
are also reflected in the pathetic genre of a publication of the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Islamabad: 'Old and infirm, maimed and
mutilated, male and female, with sucking babies, tiny toddlers and infants,
three million of them!' ('Afghan Refugees in Pakistan':3).
It is true that the image is not inappropriate for describing the misery which
is the lot of so many AR. Upon arrival, the AR are taken charge of by the
UNHCR, the Government of Pakistan and the NGOs (Non Governmental
Organizations) which offer supplies, care, and shelter with great efficiency.
Afterwards these organizations must face other, more long-term problems
such as education, the promotion of self-reliance and income generating
activities, and finding the means for their wards to return home or to be
accepted by a third country. In appealing to the UNHCR in April 1979 when
faced with a burden of refugees it could not assume alone, Pakistan put the
AR under the protection of the IOs and thus caused them to be caught up in a
complex system of customs and meanings which were foreign to them.
However, as Akbar Ahmed points out very clearly, the AR in Pakistan are
for the most part Afghan Pushtuns who have sought asylum in a Pathan
(Anglo-Indian name for Pakistani Pushtuns) territory in Pakistan, inhabited
by a population with whom they share the same language, the same culture,
and the same value system (1986: chap. 10). Rather than victims, accepted
according to humanitarian law, one could perceive them - at least in the begin-
ning of that enormous migration - as beneficiaries of traditional hospitality
offered by the Pakistanis of the NWFP to their brothers from the other side of
the border. Indeed, it was not just any hospitality, but one dictated by the
strict norms of thepushtunwali code of honour as practised by the Pushtuns.
From this viewpoint, the image that these 'refugees' offer of themselves is
not one of a mass of unarmed and helpless individuals, but one of organized
groups seeking temporary shelter among kin. We can again quote Ahmed: 'On
crossing into Pakistan, Afghans were received as fellow Muslims and, equally
important, fellow tribesmen' (1986:166). Thus we are far from the image of
the miserable masses of hopeless refugees regrouped in camps, as one pictures
them at times based on the image of the victims of other catastrophes. Instead
we have Afghan tribal groups which were received by the tribal Pushtuns of
Pakistan.
In fact, the Pakistani population sometimes wonder if they are not facing a
new type of invasion instead of a flow of victims of war. Ahmed also remarks,
that 'their bearing adds to their historical image of themselves as conquering
warriors. They are quite unlike the refugees who came to Pakistan from India
in 1947, and the Biharis from Bangladesh in 1971' (1986:165).
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A third important field of meaning is evoked by the term mohajer/moha-
jerin, an Arab term which is translated as 'refugee(s)' in all Islamic countries.
Mohajer has the same root as hejra, or Hejira, which refers to Muhammad's
flight from Mecca to Medina. The verb which is used in Persian, and in par-
ticular for all the refugees with whom we spoke, hejrat kardan, means 'to go
into exile', especially for religious reasons, when the regime in power does not
allow the free practice of Islam. A mohajer is one who voluntarily goes into
exile, and who has severed the ties with his own people and his possessions to
take refuge in a land of Islam. Thus we have a term (and a model of behaviour)
which dates back precisely to the year of the foundation of the Islamic era, 622
AD, and thus has very deep religious connotations. The historico-religious
notion of mohajer is the object of strong identification on the part of the AR.
According to this conception, the inhabitants of the host country are
associated with the merit of the mohajer; they are ansar, or auxiliaries, accord-
ing to the name given to those who, in Medina, welcomed and aided the exiled
from Mecca. For the Prophet, these two categories of believers, the mohajer
and the ansar, 'should enjoy rights of kinship with one another' (Gibb and
Kramers 1961:390). The title of ansar is used in Peshawar by the leaders of
Afghan Islamist movements in their orations, when they greet the Pakistanis
present in their midst. During these speeches they respect the hierarchical order
according to religious merit: mujahed (fighter in the jehad, or Holy War),
mohajer, and ansar.
One might presume that the AR adhere to one or another of these three sets
of meanings. It seems more accurate to us, however, to say that these three
notions coexist in the consciousness the AR have of their situation, but that
they are used in different ways, according to the context. They are used in
interactions with the representatives of the IOs, GOP delegates, nationals of
Arab countries, or Pakistani neighbours. However, the possibility of using any
of the three notions at will - mohajer, temporary guest of a related tribe, or
refugee according to the international meaning of the term - will weaken with
time. The AR are not in full control of their own situation.
Ideological and Practical Potential
Using the three types of identity, we can try to evaluate the ideological and tac-
tical potential of each. Without being exactly what Max Weber termed 'ideal
types', they do act as sets of values and meanings, and contribute to the con-
struction of identity.
The condition or the status of mohajer is very significant - the term is used
in Friday's sermon by the imam - since one is mohajer according to the model
of the Prophet's companions, who left Mecca for an honourable reason: 'But
the believers, and those who emigrate and struggle in God's way - those have
hope of God's compassion; and God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate'
(Arberry: Koran, Sflra II, 215). 'And those who emigrated, and were expelled
from their habitations, those who suffered hurt in My way, and fought, and
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were slain - them I shall surely acquit of their evil deeds, and I shall admit
them to gardens underneath which rivers flow' (Sura III, 195). As Gibb and
Kramers state, 'MuhSdjir in this way became a title of honour', and 'With the
greatest eloquence, Muhammad describes them as the particular favourites of
Allah: who will receive a splendid reward for their sacrifices' (1961:390).
The mohajer is thus not at all a shameful fugitive but, on the contrary,
someone who has made a sacrifice for his faith through leaving the comfort of
the family, and perhaps even the favours of the government in power. At the
beginning of the events in Afghanistan, several village communities left
together, under the leadership of their mullah or other religious leaders. Men
adopted or reinforced the physical appearance which is prescribed by Islamic
custom: beards and turbans (or other headgear without visor) are worn;
former middle-class educated men abandoned what resembles Western
clothing, in particular the tie or straight trousers. It is also clear that the term
mohajer only partially covers the concept of refugee as we mean it, since (still
with reference to the model of the Prophet's companions in Mecca) being
mohajer does not at all imply giving up the struggle. Instead it implies a
momentary tactical retreat preceding return and reconquest. Mohajer is thus
the other side of mujahed (fighter in the Holy War), and the two are associated
with each other in the Koran; the passages which refer to them are constantly
cited in the periodicals of the Resistance movements: 'Those who believe and
have emigrated, and have struggled in the way of God with their possessions
and their selves are mightier in rank with God; and those - they are the trium-
phant' (Sura IX, 20).
This association between mohajer and mujahed is fully assumed by many of
the AR who call themselves mujahed when they are on the point of leaving to
fight in Afghanistan, and mohajer when they are just arriving in Pakistan.
Thus, in the logic of the fighters for Islam, there is a 'two-fold' person, the
mohajer/mujahed, which of course complicates the situation and overturns
certain preconceptions held by the international officials of the UNHCR.
But the duality mohajer/mujahed is considered with irony and reproach by
the Pakistani opposition press, which see the AR as 'false refugees', dangerous
foreigners who bring risk and insecurity to Pakistan itself. As Akbar Ahmed
states, 'they are a swaggering, armed, aggressive lot' (1986:165).
With time, however, the significance of mohajer could well be questioned.
From the time that exile in Pakistan is no longer considered as a phase in the
fight for the faith, and if, instead, the AR settle in Pakistan or emigrate to
another country definitely, there is a risk that they will fall into the category of
'refugee' as it is .meant by humanitarian organizations. Or, mohajer could
come merely to signify a category of persons, a sort of ethnic term. This was
the case of the Uzbeks and Kazakhs from Soviet Central Asia who spoke a
Turkish language and fled the Soviet regime in the 1920s and 1930s for
religious reasons, and then settled in the north of Afghanistan with no hope of
returning (Shalinsky 1979). This is also what Muslims who settled in Pakistan
after the Partition (1947) and the secession of Bangladesh (1971) are called. In
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the latter case, mohajer no longer designates someone who sacrificed
homeland or possessions, nor a fighter in reprieve;- it is simply a category of
persons distinguished from the native population.
For tactical reasons, the Islamic image of mohajer is pushed to the forefront
for representatives of other Muslim countries when Islamic fraternity is in
question. It is also a powerful and significant motivational force in the con-
struction of identity. From a personal point of view, it renders a refugee
almost a fighter and, from a collective point of view, it binds the group to the
very sources of Islam.
As Edwards points out, the notion of hospitality, melmastia, as well as those
of refuge, nanawatia/nanawati, or asylum, panah, are associated with
Pushtun identity. He adds that 'migration and movement emerge as part of the
Pakhtun mythology just as cross-border movements in response to political
pressures from neighbouring governments continue to be thought of as
necessary actions taken to preserve cultural values which might otherwise be
jeopardized' (1986:317). Melmastia, nanawatia and panah are part of the
pushtunwali.
According to this code, taking a person in who is in difficulty involves rights
and obligations for both parties, and implies that the host take sides with his
protege in a quarrel (see for instance the Pakistani diplomacy in the Geneva
Talks). Of course it also supposes total protection of the guest, even at the
host's expense. At the beginning of the exodus in the early 1980s, khans
(Pathan tribal leaders) of the NWFP in Pakistan, as well as the descendants of
mehtars (sovereigns) from Chitral, settled the AR on their own lands, which
conferred certain advantages on the latter, but also implied the duties which
result from hospitality. Of course in this case, the Afghan refugees stood up
for their hosts in quarrels the latter had with their neighbours. For the AR, the
host 'par excellence' is General Zia, the present ruler of Pakistan, and consis-
tent with the duties hospitality implies, several Afghan leaders have affirmed
that they would fight for Zia-ul-Haq in case of any conflict with India. This
type of hospitality and reciprocal obligations has been studied by Lindholm
(1982), in the context of another Pushtun population, the Yusufzai of Swat.
He showed how weaker clans which had conflicts with the government or with
powerful enemies would take refuge with their neighbours, who in turn had
the possibility of recruiting armed troops from among their 'guests' to carry
out their own objectives. "The principle of refuge was formerly applied in Swat
to recruit armies from the ranks of fugitives seeking asylum', according to
Lindholm. 'Refuge, like hospitality, has its instrumental side - but refuge must
be offered even if it is politically ruinous and [...] the host can be forced into
fights he does not want by the demands of nanawatia' (Lindholm 1982:235).
In principle, the relations between guest and host do not necessarily imply
inferiority and dependence on the part of the former party, but it is clear that
if the situation continues, the honourable position which existed in the begin-
ning tends to become strained, and relations become asymmetric; a clientele
relationship can even develop.
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As Edwards also adds, 'while the institution of asylum (panah) exists in
Pakhtun society and is recognized as an honorable and necessary option
which individuals and groups must take to preserve both their own lives and
the integrity of the tribe, the individual who is granted asylum takes on an
ambivalent status which may ultimately result in his having to accept a sub-
ordinate position to his sponsor and his sponsor's tribe' (1986:318). One can-
not eternally be someone's guest without becoming dependent. In general this
hospitality is conceivable only if it is potentially reciprocal, and if after a cer-
tain lapse of time those who benefit from it return home and can, in turn, offer
hospitality themselves.
Another dissonant note concerning the situation of hospitality is the sheer
numbers which have crowded into Pakistan, and which have greatly surpassed
the capacitites of the tribes and tribal chiefs on the Pakistani side for receiving
them. One has to keep in mind, also, that many of the refugees in recent years
are not even Pushtun, but belong to other populations from Afghanistan,
for example Persian-speaking Tajiks and Turkish-speaking Uzbeks and
Turkmens, among others. Since they do not live according to thepushtunwali
code, one can understand that the notion of hospitality or asylum can no
longer characterize the whole Afghan refugee situation, nor can it furnish a
satisfactory basis for identity.
However, the melmastia and the nanawatia have certainly permitted the
management of a significant part of the relationships which exist between
Afghan and Pakistani tribal groups in the tribal zones. In fact, it is through
tribal relations that the diplomacy of Kabul has been trying to create scissions
and win over adherents.
The Use of Identity: Perspectives and Limits
In returning again to the first term, 'refugee', we discover a condition deter-
mined first and foremost by international conventions and then implemented,
quite efficiently, through a bureaucratic organization, the High Commis-
sionerate for Afghan Refugees of Pakistan. In this situation the IOs and the
host country impose very strict conditions which conform to international con-
ventions and to the ideology of IOs: demographic surveys, population cen-
suses of the camps, the distribution of documents which certify the status of
'refugee', and imposed individualization through aid, according to the in-
dividualist and democratic creed of the UNHCR.
This aid, though welcome and generally well organized, goes against tradi-
tional forms of distribution which are collective and hierarchical in nature. In
the camps when food is distributed these imbalances become evident;
dependence is obvious, as the lines of AR form to receive their food: Pakistani
guards and functionaries hold registers in which the recipients sign with a
thumbprint, concretely revealing the refugees' reality against a backdrop of
corrugated iron silos and fuel stocks, surrounded by barbed wire.
The term 'refugee' reflects a position imposed from the outside, in a foreign
ideological context, a position which supposes dependence and which
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contradicts - partially at least - the ideas of mohajer and melmastia-
nanawatia. This situation of dependence is disparaged even more because it
implies the abandonment of a tribal code of honour, of a part of the Islamic
religious ethic and, at least in part, of ties with the qawm (lineage or regional
group). This is why, in the Afghan refugee villages, the AR try to recreate
something of their autonomy, either through the role they accord their former
or new 'tribal' notables, or through the structures set up by the political parties
of the Resistance (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1987).
Circumstances have forced the AR to conform to the image of a foreign-
imposed identity, whereas in identifying either with the mohajer or as a
neighbour's temporary guest, they call upon ideological and practical
resources drawn from their own culture. In addition, the notion of 'refugee' in
a context of human and international rights represents very large stakes since it
is through this channel that the UNHCR, the World Food Programme, the
World Bank and the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs) send food, medical
assistance, and all other forms of aid.
The refugees, and the notion 'refugee', are also the stakes of Resistance
groups - particularly of Islamist parties - who seek control of the camps and
of the religious schools. On several occasions collaborators of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, leader of the most radical Islamist party, told us that represen-
tatives of their movenlent were better able to organize aid distribution and to
fight against corruption than agents of the IOs.
Each Resistance party has its own religious schools (primary and sometimes
secondary) in the camps, called madrassa. Schoolbooks emphasize notions
such as mohajer/mujahed/jehad. Aid organizations of Arab countries open
hospitals and supply dispensaries and are thus sometimes in direct competition
with international or Western humanitarian organizations. Thus it is not sur-
prising to see the AR act like 'refugees', in the UNHCR sense of the term,
offering the image of a good recipient of welfare - a grateful, docile victim -
to foreign visitors, VEPs. and journalists. Certainly it is an act which, though
contrary to the Afghan ethos, is considered to be necessary and profitable, but
it is also a trap within which the refugees actually do become increasingly
dependent.
It is not surprising either that when faced with interlocutors other than the
IOs and other Western organizations, they insist on presenting themselves as
Muslim and mohajer. Seen from the outside, each of these identities not only
is different, but also seems incompatible with the others. In a Koranic passage
known by all refugees, Muhammad and his mohajer companions act as in-
dependent agents, making new alliances, fighting battles, and finally triumph-
ing over their enemies and reconquering Mecca. As we saw, the roles of
mohajer/mujahed and refugee/fighter, are relative to time and space. In the
camps the refugees take in the mujahedin returning from combat. The
religious schoolmasters in the camps must carry out military service in
Afghanistan during the school holidays. Certain madrassa for refugee children
offer paramilitary training.
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Mohajer does not correspond to the UN definition of refugees, and the
UNHCR in particular has to distinguish clearly fighters from expatriated vic-
tims. They struggle to prohibit any arms in the camps and attempt, sometimes
vainly, to ensure that the aid which is given out does not end up diverted as
supplies to the 'bachelor camps', in other words to the mujahedin. But the
definition of 'refugee' according to the pushtunwali ethos is also not accep-
table to the UNHCR, which considers the community ties - and in particular
the ties of dependence with traditional notables - to be incompatible with the
fair and equal distribution of aid. The UNHCR tries, with a fair amount of
success, to sever former ties, to suppress the system of redistribution by malek,
and to replace it with a direct system of aid to heads of families (Centlivres and
Centlivres-Demont 1987).
But melma ('host' in pushtu) and mohajer are not compatible either, since
the Islamist movement, which is very influential in the refugee villages, refuses
any basis other than Islam for society in general, and for political institutions
in particular. It absolutely takes exception - even if it admits to certain prac-
tical compromises - to anything which resembles ethnic and tribal allegiances
and 'clientelism'. But for the AR, these diverse constituents of their identity
are not contradictory. The situation in which they find themselves has brought
them not only to accept food rations from the UNHCR, but also to define
themselves as exiled for their faith and to make use of their position within the
tribal structure.
Implications of Long-term Exile
Everything leads us to believe, however, that a prolonged period of exile in
Pakistan will tend to favour the reality of 'refugee' in the way it is defined by
the UNHCR, rendering the other two meanings less credible and less
operative. From a certain point of view, this new and complex identity con-
stitutes a different kind of anchorage from the former feelings of ethnic or
regional appurtenance; different, too, from the sentiment of belonging .to
Islam which is simply an attachment to its cultural character and traditional
practices. This deepened commitment to Islam, considered as an ideology, per-
mits the emergence of a renewed concept of State and power (Roy 1985:107)
and is precisely that which makes a good.number of refugees adhere to the
Islamist parties of the Afghan Resistance to the detriment of former ethnic or
tribal solidarities.
The Afghans are not the only ones to have found a new identity by redefin-
ing themselves in relation to the situation of exile: the host country, or at least
certain of its inhabitants or leaders, also define themselves in relation to the
refugees. As ansar, or auxiliaries, neighbours, and poor but gracious hosts,
weighed down by the overwhelming burden of three million refugees but
brothers in Islam and hospitable cousins, the inhabitants of Pakistan and its
Government thus deserve the sympathy of the 'free world', and the support of
Islamic countries. By offering asylum, are they not increasing their 'symbolic
capital', and their economic opportunities as well? This is what political
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commentators say, with some cynicism, when they point out that with the
arrival of the Afghans, the authoritarian government of General Zia acquired
a new honourability and considerable foreign aid.
So, part of the Pakistani population takes exception to the reassuring image
of the guest/host relationship. For them, the AR are too numerous, have re-
mained in the NWFP for too long, and are suspected of all sorts of trafficking.
Their behaviour is far from being that of melma, a guest with the rights - and
especially the duties - described by the pushtunwali.
The very presence of three million refugees as the UNHCR defines them
provokes the impatience of the Pakistanis. In the opinion of many of them,
the free aid and the camp infrastructures available to the AR permit the
refugees to accept salaries lower than those demanded by Pakistani workers,
thus enabling the refugees to compete more favourably for local employment.
In addition, the mohajer is perceived, as we have seen, as a 'false' refugee who
does not conform to a dependent role and threatens the security of Pakistan by
guerrilla activities carried out against a neighbour.
In demanding that the AR be sent back to their country, many Pakistanis do
not - or no longer - see themselves in the role of ansar, no more than they see
themselves as tribal hosts. Nor would they be prepared to recognize the exiled
Afghans in their country as refugees in the terms of the Convention of 1951.
If the Afghan problem cannot be resolved soon, it may well be that Pakistan
- under pressure from its neighbours and the opposition within the country -
will reinforce its borders with Afghanistan and confine the AR to the camps.
In these conditions, a long-term exile in Pakistan would render the AR even
more dependent on IOs and the UNHCR, which would mean the two other
forms of identity would become less credible for the AR's interlocutors and
less salient for themselves.
Thus, one can better understand the determination of the Afghan com-
munities to keep a certain degree of autonomy in relation to the Pakistani
camp administration, for example by maintaining committees headed by
leaders or representatives of the Resistance parties (Centlivres 1987). One can
also better understand their determination to keep up their hopes of returning
to Afghanistan and not to relinquish any of the three components of their
identity: refugee/mohajer/melma.
The philosophy and the laws of the international conventions on refugees
are, for us, universal; they are derived from 'human rights'. Yet they also
belong to Western history and philosophy, and in this sense they may be
foreign to the cultural tradition of those to which they are applied. To impose
them without considering possible differences is to risk misunderstanding and
conflict; it may even threaten the raison d'itre of those compelled to seek
assistance.
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